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BARGAINING POWER AS A MEAf4S TO ACHIEVE FAIR RETURNS TO FARMERsl/ 
By 
Dennis R. Henderson.01 
First, I would like to say that it's nice to be back in Michigan, 
the original home of George Washington. I notice several dumbfounded 
looks. Let n~ explain. As the story goes, George was born in rural 
Michigan and one day chopped down the proverbial cherry tree. When 
questioned by his father, young George said, 11 1 cannot tell a lie, 
\ 
it was I. 11 The senior Washington responded, in that case young 
George would never make it in Michigan politics. So he moved off to 
Virginia and became a success. 
The Current Farm Problem 
-----
Recently, interest in agricultura·1 policy has reached flood tide. 
Farmers are caught in an income pinch, the magnitude of which is 
unprecedented s i nee the depres.s ion yea rs. We know only too we 11 that 
prices for farm-produced commodities have dropped sharply in the 
last two years, while the cost of production inputs has risen dramatically. 
Of course, some of the increases in production costs reflect highly 
inflated land values. Clearly, some farmers paid too much for land, 
and unless they have a large base of lm-Jer cost land over which to 
spread costs, are definitely feeling a cash flow bind. Furthermore, 
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weather-related crop losses have hit some farmers much harder than 
others. 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that we have a serious income 
problem in American agriculture. Realized net farm income in 1977, 
when adjusted for the impact of inflation, was the lowest since the 
depression years. Also in 1977, for the first time ever, the farmers' 
share of the consumer's food dollar was less than the share going 
to labor in the marketing system. Fanners' concern for their current 
economic plight has been clearly evidenced in the American Agricultural 
Movement, the call for a farm strike, and the parade of farmers and 
tractors around State capitals and down Pennsylvania Avenue. 
The question I want to discuss with you today is, what is the 
potential role for collective bargaining by farmers to deal with 
depressed current farm incomes. How do the results of collective bar-
gaining compare with those which can be achieved through strikes and 
farmers' holidays? And, what.is the political climate for broadening 
the legal foundation for collective bargaining by American farmers? 
Benefits to Collective Bargaining 
First, let's look at the track record of collective bargaining, 
and examine what has been its impact on farm income. You in Michigan 
have been on the forefront of the farmer bargaining effort. Your 
Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act has established a new legal 
frontier for co·11ective action. Two sets of observations, I believe, 
C speak to the effectiveness of this approach in your State. First, 
the fact that an increasing number of farmers have worked to establish 
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accredited bargaining associations suggests that farmers clearly per-
ceive the real benefits to be gained from this marketing approach. 
Second, the aggressive resistance of numerous handlers and processors 
to both the law and to its impler.~ntation and administration stands 
as convincing testimony that buyers of agricultural products perceive 
more than a modicum of income shift to tanners as a result of organized 
bargaining. 
Furthennore, an expanding body of empirical evidence points to 
appreciable income advantages as a result of col~ective bargaining. 
Just a couple of examples: John Havens, President of the Freemont, 
Ohio Tomato Growers has reported more than a $3 per ton gain in grower 
prices in 1977 directly attributable to the activities of that voluntary 
bargaining association. A carefully designed study of the bargaining 
activities by a voluntary association of northeastern Ohio grape 
growers revealed a positive net price impact of about 15 percent, over 
several years, directly attributable to the bargaining effort. 
And, of course, the success of many dairy cooperatives in negotiating 
over order premiums has become an example of bargaining gains familiar 
to almost everyone. 
Additionally, several studies have shown that price fluctuations 
have been reduced significantly through collective bargaining efforts. 
Less price fluctuation results in reduced uncertainty for farmers, 
which allows more effective long-term planning, thus more efficient 
use of resources. This, in turn, has a positive long-term impact 
' on farm income. And, these gains have been achieved with voluntary 
associations. Certainly the potential is considerable, to achieve 
even more impn?ssive gains \I/here the bargainin9 effort can be r11ade unifonn 
. 
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across a market, as under the Michigan law. 
I do not mean to imply that collective bargaining is the only 
marketing tool which farmers need to deal effectively with untoward 
economic events. There are several real economic limits, such as 
product substitution, production responses to higher prices, and buyer 
resistance, to the gains achievable with this technique. ~ut, the 
evidence does point out that collective bargaining can be, in some 
situations, one effective tool for positively impacting upon farm income. 
\ 
The Impact of Fann Strikes· ' 
How does collective bargaining compare with withholding actions 
as a marketin~ tool? Farm strikes have a colorful history in the U.S. 
Starting with the burning of cotton in 1904 by Texas fanners and the 
burning of gins by the 11 Ni ght Ride rs 11 four years later, through the 
Fanners' Holiday in 1932 to the NFO holding actions of the 1960's and 
the mass calf slaughterings of, the 1970's, farmers' strikes have had 
little perceptible impact on farm prices. 
The combination of perishability and annual production render 
many agricultural commodities unsuitable for withholding actions. 
It's hard to convince a farr.ier that he should withhold his products 
from the market when those products represent a year's work and a 
lifetime investment, and when they will spoil if not quickly processed. 
Thus, withholding actions are fine to talk about when no one is 
harvestiny perishable µroducts which h<lVe to be llldrketed or lost, but 
trwy cannot be very effective as an actual marketin9 tool. 
The strik0, however, has played ,.rn important political role in 
the history of American agriculture by focusing public attention on a 
. 
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farm problem and thus helping to generate political relief. Perhaps, 
this was best dramatized when the national fann strike set for 
May 13, 1933, was cancelled when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was 
. 
signed the day before. Likewise, the current strike action of the 
American Agricultural Movement is gaining considerable political 
attention. Many Congressional hearings have been held as a result, 
/ 
and numerous meetings have taken place between fanners, Congressmen 
and Department of Agriculture officials. 
Of course, whether anyone will do anything ·~s a result, remains 
' .... -/ 
to be seen. It's like the Department of Agriculture official who 
went to college. He couldn't decide whether to study farming or 
agriculture. 8ut he was smart enough to ask the difference. When 
it was expla·ined that farming was 11 doing it, 11 he chose agriculture. 
The Policy Issues 
To date, quite frankly, collective bargaining has not entered 
. 
squarely into the fann policy debate. Yet, as we well know, if 
collective bargaining is going to be an effective long-term marketing 
alternative for farmers, it must be supported as a matter of public 
policy. This means a national agricultural bargaining law. 
The nearest thing we now have to national legislation is the 
Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967. That law prohibits discrimina-
tion by handlers against farmers because of membership in an association. 
However, it has heen largely ineffective in facilitatin9 collective 
C, bargaining. Just 20 complaints have been filed under that Act in its 
10 years of existence. Of these, only four have reached litigation, 
' 
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and collective bargaining has actually been stymied by the results of 
those litigations. Court decisions have held that, while a producer 
cannot be unfairly treated because he is. a member of an association, 
the handler has no obligation under the law to recognize an association 
as the producer's agent. There is no such legal obligation even 
where the producer has joined for the expressed purpose of having 
the association deal on his behalf with the handler. 
By refusing to deal with producers• associations, handlers can 
\ 
very easily render them ineffective, thus mai n.tai1ni ng a market power 
imbalance which favors the buyer. Recognition by the handler of a 
bargaining association as the exclusive sales agent of producers is 
' the most essential condition to effective collective bargaining. 
Without some compulsion for handlers to recognize duly constituted 
associations as the exclusive agen~ of their members, bargaining collectively 
with farmers is often little more than a public relations ploy. Without 
such compulsion nationwide, th'e potential is also limited. Under 
State law, it is limited by geographic boundaries, whne the potential 
for success in States without facilitating legislation is clearly 
circumscribed. 
There is, however, considerable controversy over what should be 
the provisions of any Federal Act. Let me highlight the most salient 
of these, for we need the benefit of your ideas and experience in 
formulating the most effective bargaining policy. 
First, what commodities should be covered? Perhaps, not all of 
agriculture lends it<.:.elf lo collective barquinin9. It seems to work 
best for those products which farmers produce or sell under contract, 
such as milk, fruits and w~getables. This, because the terms of such 
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contracts, including prices or pricing provisions, are usually negotiated 
infrequently--once a year or so--rather than at each.sale. It's more 
difficult to collectively negotiate pric~s for something like live-
stock, for example, where the tenns of sale are negotiated each time 
an individual fanner makes a sale. It could be done, but it certainly 
is more complex. / 
But, does this mean that facilitating legislation should be limited 
to specified colllllodities? One problem with limiting coverage to, 
say fruits and vegetables, is defining what th~t\include~. Would 
, 
such coverage include tree crops? Uhat about nuts? Or peanuts? 
How about sugar crops? Or possibly even soybeans or high-lysine corn? 
~ Alternatively, if no colllllodity specification is included, the burden 
is shifted directly to farmers to detennine for which commodities 
they can effectively use this as a marketing alternative. 
' 
Another issue is the status of processing cooperatives as handlers. 
Many processing cooperatives dperate much like proprietary handlers, 
and are concerned primarily with maximizing product throughputs and 
maintaining resale markets. Exempting these cooperatives could give 
them a substantial competitive advantage vis-a-vis other processors. 
Yet, it seems almost nonsensical to have farmers bargaining with themselves. 
A third set of questions deal with what producers are included 
in the bargaining effort. Should an association, once certified, 
represent everyone shipping to a given handler, or only its members? 
Related to this is the highly controversial question, what share of 
the market should be n~presented by the association in order to gain 
certification? The "free rider" problem argues for inclusive 
representat"ion. And certainly if the certified association becomes 
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the exclusive representative of all producers in a market, as is 
provided for in your Michigan law, a majority membership rule seems 
appropriate. 
Personally, however, I believe that a degree of competition 
between bargaining associations is not necessarily a bad thing. By 
requiring something on the order of 25 to 40 percent market representa-
tion for certification, I believe we can assure that most certified 
associations have an effective base for bargaining without precluding 
two or more associations from competing in th~ skme ma~ket. We very 
much need your input on.this very crucial question. 
The fourth question is, what kind of settlement procedure should 
be provided for in bargaining legislation? Note that I did not raise 
the question, should a settlement procedure be included, but rather what 
kind of procedure. It is not realistic to assume that collective 
bargaining in agriculture will have widespread success without some 
mandatory settlement or arbittation procedure. In labor bargaining, 
the job action, that is, strikes and lockouts, provides the incentive 
for both sides to reach agreement. However, there is a big difference 
between wi thho l ding one ··s labor services and refusing to p 1 ant a crop. 
With labor, production is lost just a day at a time. In much of agriculture. 
it's lost a year at a time. The potential loses to parties on both 
sides of the bargaining effort of a "crop action 11 are simply too great 
to make this an effective tool for either side to use to force a settle-
rnent. Thus, it seems absol utc ly es sen ti al that agricultural bargaining 
legislation provide for a settl~nent mechanism that can be invoked 
when an impasse is reached across the bargaining table. It is necessary 
to prevent catastrophic losses on both sides, and to encourage genuine 
. ' 
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efforts on both sides to reach agreement. The difficult question 
is, what should that settlement procedure be? 
Finally, let me turn my attention to what I perceive to be the 
climate in Washington for Federal legislation. Collective bargaining 
has not received much attention by the current Administration of 
the Department of Agriculture in its policy debate. Yet, there are 
some signs which suggest that the Department will support a well-
conceived and operationally feasible legislativ~ initiative. For 
one, the current activities of the American A~r~cultura~ Movement 
have resulted in greater interest by policymakers in any policy 
initiative which would demonstrate active concern with the current 
fann situation. Also, the Administration has clearly endorsed the 
concept of cooperative marketing. 
But, will a favorable attitude in the Department of Agriculture 
be sufficient? To answer that, it is insightful to examine the decision-
making structure of the entiri? Executive Branch of the Federal Govern-
r11ent. One of my earliest observations upon arriving in Hashington 
last year was the domination of the Office of Management and Budget 
over the policies of the Department of Agriculture and other Federal 
agencies. 
To understand why, it's instructive to look at the history of 
OMB. Managen~nt was added to the budget office under the Nixon-Ash 
plan to centralize decisionmaking in the Administration at the White 
House. OMB, along with a parcel of rules and regulations funnelling 
virtually clll policy decisions to the Chief Executive through that 
agency, became the primary vehicle for implementing central control in 
Government. This was Nixon's mechanism for bringing about his "New 
l=o,!o.,.::.1; cm 11 
• < 
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Now, we have a Chief Executive who espouses decentralization, 
who apparently has no 11 New Federalism" or "Great Society" or "New 
Frontier" or "Fair Deal" or whatever. The rhetoric is, let decision-
making rest with the Departments and agencies, with those persons most 
knowledgeable in a particular area. Yet, OMB, the central control 
agency, is still alive and thriving. Thus, we now have a control system 
with no one in control. OMB has the authority to coordinate administra-
tive policy, but little policy direction has emerged from the White 
House. As a result, OMB has exercised their authority by subjecting 
each Department's policy proposals to review by just about any other 
agency who might even remotely be interested. 
With food and agricultural issues being among the most popularly 
prominent, almost everyone gets into the act--with force. Not 
necessarily enough force to cause outright rejection of the proposed 
policy, but often enough to prevent implementation without modification. 
This has resulted in the involvement of numerous other agencies in 
the formulation of agricultural policy in general. Collective bargain-
ing policy for farmers is no exception. 
Four other agencies--the Federal Trade Commission, the Department 
of Justice, the Council of Economic Advisers and the Council on Wage 
and Price Stability--have become notable opponents to any Federal 
legislative initiative which would facilitate collective bargaining 
by farmers. ~·Jhy? Let me simply highlight their objections. Listen 
carefully, because these are the most important points which must be 
convincingly refuted by the ~19ricultural cormnmity if any effective 
national bargaining legislation is to see the light of day. First, 
they argue that there is no need for legislation which will enhance 
I . ~ 
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fanners' market power, as they see no evidence that there is a present 
imbalance in bargaining power between fanners and handlers. They 
are quick to point to a few large cooperatives as evidence to the 
contrary. Further, they argue that, even if an imbalance exists, it 
is not clear that a redress would be in the public interest. They 
also argue that collective bargaining legislation would result in 
restrictions on buyers• choices in the marketplace, that it would 
encourage the development of monopoly cooperatives, and that it would 
result in higher food prices. All of these results, by implication, 
are socially undesirable. 
Some of these arguments have merit~ depending upon what kind of 
legislative initiative is put forward. For example, legislation that 
would establish one association as the exclusive agent for all producers 
in a defined market could certainly be viewed as facilitating monopoly 
power, at least in the defined market. And, higher farm prices could 
result in higher food prices, where handlers, processors, and retailers 
have enough market power to pass them along. But$ armed with an objective 
and well-conceived legislative proposal, most of these criticisms 
will not stand up. We are genuinely interested in working with you 
to develop such a proposal. 
Let me close by reporting the results of a recent survey to reveal 
the three most mistrusted statements in the United States. The first of 
these is, 11 My check is in the mai1. 11 Second, 11 0f course, I will respect 
you in the morning." And, third, 11 I'm from Washington and I'm here 
to help you. 11 I hope that we've bridged that gap a bit today. Thank 
you. 
